ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date 10/17/80

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REMARKS

Attached are the questions from the Security

Budget Hearing and their written responses which

we have sent to [ ]

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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	4E20 HQS
	Phone No.
Deputy Chief, Administration Group	

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Question 4: What are the Office of Security APEX costs for 1981? Include both manpower and funds recognizing that the latter are now included in the ICS budget. What are the Office of Security APEX costs for the 1982-1986 period, by year? What will these funds provide?

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
In their totality, these funds will provide for the implementation of the 4C registry system and will permit compliance with the increased security requirements of APEX in terms of technical security and computer security monitoring.

The 4C system represents a very significant improvement over SPECLE. The 4C system is associated with APEX, but it actually predates the APEX concept for it has been the desire of the Community since at least 1975 to have an improved centralized registry. At the present time, every department and agency keeps its own records of SCI access approvals. Some of these records are computerized; some are manual. Even the computerized records are not mutually compatible, however, since they were established for different purposes at different periods of time and using different systems. The 4C data base is being configured to be as responsive as possible to the need of the NFIB agencies. It will contain approximately 60 major accesses. In addition to the standard identifying data such as name, date of birth, etc., it will also admit billet data, which is indispensable to DoD components for access management. It will also show the government sponsor for each contractor access. Instead of the cumbersome update procedure for SPECLE, the 4C system will allow "real-time" updates from the consoles, or batch update via tape drive. Of extreme importance, the 4C system will permit an archival function for historical records, thus when an accessed individual is debriefed, the 4C system will continue to carry a record in archives, readily permitting an NFIB agency to reactivate an APEX access or determine eligibility. This single feature should save considerable duplication of investigative effort. The 4C system should permit a dramatic decrease in the 8,000 cables generated annually by CIB under the SPECLE system. It will permit a uniform, standardized recording procedure and will

have the additional feature of providing a central registry of APEX-approved facilities. This is crucial to a cardinal feature of APEX, the goal of uniformity and avoidance of unnecessary duplication. At the present time it is not uncommon for different agencies with SCI activities in a given facility to conduct successive, repetitive, and costly investigations in the same facility, each agency unaware of the other's interest. The Compartmented Information Branch, which currently uses and maintains the SPECLE data base will perform the same functions with the 4C data base. The additional positions requested for 4C are for computer and telecommunications systems support -- computer operators, software and telecommunications equipment maintenance, personnel, etc. The analogous functions for SPECLE have been performed centrally by ODP. Initially with the expected efficiencies that 4C will bring to CIB operations, we anticipate we may be able to eliminate two positions.

The funds for technical and computer security specialists will facilitate a measurable improvement of the security of SCI activities. These funds will permit technical and security countermeasures inspections of both government and contractor sites where some of the government's most sensitive activities are conducted and will provide an indispensable scrutiny of the vulnerabilities inherent in computerized operations.

(Note: Information on total CIA costs for APEX is provided in response to a separate question under the hearing "General Support.")

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